

**AP HUMAN GEOGRAPHY**  
**(2020-2021)**  
**Summer Assignment**

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The Advanced Placement curriculum is meant to give you an idea of what a college-level experience is like. Many college classes today involve technology, specifically software for online message board discussions, upload files, and submit work electronically. Although I have a Google Classroom (noted above) which provides the documentation in this course, I will also provide paper copies. (\*\*NOTE: Incoming Freshman only: since you do not have a nova-student email account set up yet, please refer to the website above. You are able to download the documents BUT make sure you save the downloaded document to your computer before submitting to my nova-faculty email). I **would not** recommend completing additional assignments on the website (Basics through Unit 7) as I continually change/update!

Human Geography is a very diverse course, involving a wide range of topics. Instead of reading from the textbook for the summer assignment, I am providing articles and videos that will cover some of those topics. After reading these articles and viewing the videos, you will come into class with a better understanding of how to apply the concepts and vocabulary to the real world. This summer assignment will help you in many ways: (1) do better in the course, (2) participate in class discussion on the first day, and (3) prepare you for the test which will be given the first week of school. Additionally, the assignment will be graded.

**Directions:** Unless otherwise noted, answer each question in full and complete sentences – paragraph format. You do not need to rewrite the question. To help answer each question, it is recommended that you turn the question into a statement, and then complete your answer. Do not start your answer with a pronoun.

**Format:** You may handwrite or type your responses. Include your name and the name of the specific assignment (i.e., Reading #1 – Globalization) at the beginning of your responses. If typed, double-spaced, 12-point font. You can email the assignment to me at the email address at the top of this page at any time over the summer or turn it into Google Classroom (for those students who already have a nova account). When answering the questions, please try not to heavily quote. When quoting, you must provide the proper punctuation.

**Due Date:** No later than the first day of class. However, you may email your assignment to me anytime over the summer. \*\*NOTE: I am always available by email to help in anyway.

**Assignments:** There are two articles and two videos with accompanying questions. You do not need to do them in the order listed.

Reading 1: Globalization  
Reading 2: The Geography of Gender  
Reading 3: Where the Hell is Matt? 2012



# How India Became America

By AKASH KAPUR (New York Times – March 9, 2012)  
(Adapted for the use of students by Marilyn Carmody, NOVA Academy, CA)



Shoppers in the Express Avenue Mall, the largest in Chennai, India

## Pondicherry, India

ANOTHER brick has come down in the great wall separating India from the rest of the world. Starbucks and Amazon have entered the Indian market. Amazon already started a comparison shopping site; [Starbucks opened its first outlet in the summer of 2012].

As one Indian newspaper put it, this could be “the final stamp of globalization.”

For me, though, the arrival of these two companies, so emblematic of American consumerism, and so emblematic, too, of the West Coast techie culture that has infiltrated India’s own booming technology sector, is a sign of something more distinctive. It signals the latest episode in India’s remarkable process of Americanization.

I grew up in rural India, the son of an Indian father and American mother. I spent many summers (and the occasional biting, shocking winter) in rural Minnesota. I always considered both countries home. In truth, though, the India and America of my youth were very far apart: cold war adversaries, America’s capitalist exuberance a sharp contrast to India’s austere socialism. For much of my life, my two homes were literally — but also culturally, socially and experientially — on opposite sides of the planet.

All that began changing in the early 1990s, when India liberalized its economy. Since then, I’ve watched India’s transformation with exhilaration, but occasionally, and increasingly, with some anxiety.

I left for boarding school in America in 1991. By the time I graduated from high school, two years later, Indian cities had filled with shopping malls and glass-paneled office buildings. In the countryside, thatch huts had given way to concrete homes, and cashew and mango plantations were being replaced by gated communities. In both city and country, a newly liberated population was indulging in a frenzy (some called it an orgy) of consumerism and self-expression.

More than half a century ago, R. K. Narayan, that great chronicler of India in simpler times, wrote about his travels in America. “America and India are profoundly different in attitude and philosophy,” he wrote. “Indian philosophy stresses austerity and unencumbered, uncomplicated day-to-day living. America’s emphasis, on the other hand, is on material acquisition and the limitless pursuit of prosperity.” By the time I decided to return to India for good, in 2003, Narayan’s observations felt outdated. A great reconciliation had taken place; my two homes were no longer so far apart.

This reconciliation — this Americanization of India — had both tangible and intangible manifestations. The tangible signs included an increase in the availability of American brands; a noticeable surge in the population of American businessmen (and their booming voices) in the corridors of five-star hotels; and, also, a striking use of American idiom and American accents. In outsourcing companies across the country, Indians were being taught to speak more slowly and stretch their O’s. I found myself turning my head (and wincing a little) when I heard young Indians call their colleagues “dude.”

But the intangible evidence of Americanization was even more remarkable. Something had changed in the very spirit of the country. The India in which I grew up was, in many respects, an isolated and dour place of limited opportunity. The country was straitjacketed by its moralistic rejection of capitalism, by a lethargic and often depressive fatalism.

Now it is infused with an energy, a can-do ambition and an entrepreneurial spirit that I can only describe as distinctly American. In surveys of global opinion, Indians consistently rank as among the most optimistic people in the world. Bookstores are stacked with titles like “India Arriving,” “India Booms” and “The Indian Renaissance.” The Pew Global Attitudes Project, which measures opinions across major countries, regularly finds that Indians admire values and attributes typically thought of as American: free-market capitalism, globalization. Substantial majorities associate Americans with values like hard work and inventiveness, and even during the Iraq war, India’s views of America remained decidedly positive.

I HAVE learned, though, that the nation’s new American-style prosperity is a more complex, and certainly more ambivalent, phenomenon than it first appears. The villages around my home have undeniably grown more prosperous, but they are also more troubled. Abandoned fields and fallow plantations are indications of a looming agricultural and environmental crisis. Ancient social structures are collapsing under the weight of new money. Bonds of caste and religion and family have frayed; the village assemblies made up of elders, have lost their traditional authority. Often, lawlessness and violence step into the vacuum left behind.

I recently spoke with a woman in her mid-50s who lives in a nearby village. She leads a simple life (impoverished even, by American standards), but she is immeasurably better off than she

was a couple of decades ago. She grew up in a thatch hut. Now she lives in a house with a concrete roof, running water and electricity. Her son owns a cellphone and drives a motorcycle. Her niece is going to college.

But not long before we talked, there had been a murder in the area, the latest in a series of violent attacks and killings. Shops that hadn't existed a decade ago were boarded up in anticipation of further violence; police patrolled newly tarred roads. The woman was scared to leave her home.

"This is what all the money has brought to us," she said to me. "We were poor, but at least we didn't need to worry about our lives. I think it was better that way."

Hers is a lament — against rapid development, against the brutality of modernity — that I have heard with increasing frequency. India's Americanization has in so many ways been a wonderful thing. It has lifted millions from poverty, and, by seeding ideas of meritocracy and individual attainment into the national imagination, it has begun the process of dismantling an old and often repressive order. More and more, though, I find myself lying awake at night, worrying about what will take the place of that order. The American promise of renewal and reinvention is deeply seductive — but, as I have learned since coming back home, it is also profoundly menacing.

## **QUESTIONS:**

1. How does the title of the article itself describe the idea of globalization?
2. Describe in detail the different ways that the author claims that India is becoming more Americanized (discussed throughout the article).
3. Towards the end of the article, the author describes the Americanization of India as ". . . more complex . . . than it first appears." Describe his feelings.
4. EXTRA CREDIT QUESTION: Based on the article and your own feelings, describe how globalization of culture (being exposed to different types of food, clothing, religions, languages, technology, dress, etc.) can be both positive and negative for individuals and their cultures.

## Reading No. 2: The Geography of Gender


For this assignment, you will have two tasks: watch a documentary film trailer entitled “It’s a Girl” and read an article from *The Economist* entitled “The Worldwide War on Baby Girls.” Both deal with the same topic, sometimes called gendercide or femicide, referring to the abandonment, aborting, selling, mistreating, or outright killing of girls based solely on their gender.

The case studies for such behavior are from India, China, and many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The topic of gender touches on cultural values, population issues, religious beliefs, and differences in development between countries. It is true that you can tell much about a country based on the role and status of women.

As you view and read, think about the different life experiences between different women in different parts of the world, based only on being female.

### It’s a Girl:

*\*\*Please watch the trailer for the film “It’s a Girl” as an introduction before reading the article. You can also YouTube “It’s a Girl trailer.”*



<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISme5-9orR0>

### The Worldwide War on Baby Girls:

*The Economist*, March 4, 2010

(Adapted for the use of students by Marilyn Carmody, NOVA Academy, CA)



Note that the questions do not necessarily follow the chronological order of the article, but are answered throughout the entire article. Meaning, the answer to #1 may be answered in many ways throughout the whole article, not just from information on page 1.

XINRAN XUE, a Chinese writer, describes visiting a peasant family in the Yimeng area of Shandong province. The wife was giving birth. “We had scarcely sat down in the kitchen,” she writes, “when we heard a moan of pain from the bedroom . . . The cries from the inner room grew louder and abruptly stopped. There was a low sob, and then a man’s gruff voices said accusingly: ‘Useless thing!’ Suddenly, I thought I heard a slight movement in the slops pail behind me. To my absolute horror, I saw a tiny foot poking out of the pail. The midwife must have dropped that tiny baby alive into the slops pail! I nearly threw myself at it, but the two policemen [who had accompanied me] held my shoulders in a firm grip. ‘Don’t move, you can’t save it, it’s too late.’ But that’s . . . murder. . . and you’re the police!” The little foot was still now. The policemen held on to me for a few more minutes. “Doing a baby girl is not a big thing around here,” [an] older woman said comfortingly. “That’s a living child,” I said in a shaking voice, pointing at the slops pail. “It’s not a child,” she corrected me. “It’s a girl baby, and we can’t keep it. Around these parts, you can’t get by without a son. Girl babies don’t count.”

In January 2010 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) showed what can happen to a country when girl babies don’t count. Within ten years, one in five young men would be unable to find a bride because of the death of young women, a figure unprecedented in a country at peace. The number is based on the sexual discrepancy among people aged 19 and below. According to CASS, by 2020 China will have 30m-40m more men of this age than young women. For comparison, there are 23m boys below the age of 20 in Germany, France and Britain combined and around 40m American boys and young men. So within ten years, China faces the prospect of having the equivalent of the whole young male population of America, or almost twice that of Europe’s three largest countries, with little prospect of marriage, untethered to a home of their own and without the stake in society that marriage and children provide.

Genocide – to borrow the title of a 1985 book by Mary Ann Warren – is often seen as an unintended consequence of China’s one-child policy, or as a product of poverty or ignorance. But that cannot be the whole story. The surplus of bachelors – called in China *guanggun*, or “bare branches” – seems to have accelerated between 1990 and 2005, in ways not obviously linked to the one-child policy, introduced in 1979. The war against baby girls is not confined to China. Parts of India also has skewed sex ratios. Other Eastern Asian countries – South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – have peculiarly high numbers of male births.


The real cause, argues Nick Eberstadt, a demographer at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank in Washington, D.C., is not any country’s policy but “the fateful collision between overweening son preference, the use of rapidly spreading prenatal sex-determination technology and declining fertility.” These are global trends.

Boys are slightly more likely to die in infancy than girls. To compensate, more boys are born than girls so there will be equal numbers of young men and women at puberty. In all societies that record births, between 103 and 106 boys are normally born for every 100 girls. The ratio has been so stable over time that it appears to be the natural order of things.

That order has changed fundamentally in the past 25 years. In China the sex ratio those born between 1985 and 1989 was 108, just outside the natural range. For those born in 2000-04, it

was 124 (i.e., 124 boys were born every 100 girls). According to CASS, the ratio today is 123 boys per 100 girls. These rates are biologically impossible without human intervention.

According to an analysis of Chinese household data carried out in late 2005 (reported in the *British Medical Journal*) only one region, Tibet, has a sex ratio within the bounds of nature. Fourteen provinces, mostly in the east and south, have sex ratios 120+, and three have more than 130. As CASS says, “the gender imbalance has been growing wider year after year.”



South Korea is experiencing some surprising consequences. The surplus of bachelors in a rich country has sucked in brides from abroad. In 2008, 11% of marriages were “mixed”, mostly between a Korean man and a foreign woman. This is causing tensions, which is often hostile to the children of mixed marriages. The trend is especially marked in rural areas, where the government thinks half the children of farm households will be mixed by 2020. The children are common enough to have produced a new word: “Kosians,” or Korean-Asians.

China is nominally a communist country, but elsewhere it was communism’s collapse that was associated with the growth of sexual disparities. After the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, there was an upsurge in the ratio of boys to girls in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Their sex ratios rose from normal levels in 1991 to 115-120 by 2000. A rise also occurred in several Balkan states after the wars of Yugoslav succession. The ratio in Serbia and

Macedonia is around 108. There are even signs of distorted sex ratios in America, among various groups of Asian-Americans. In 1975, the sex ratio for Chinese-, Japanese-, and Filipino-Americans was between 100 and 106. In 2002, it was 107 to 109.

But the country with the most remarkable record is that other supergiant, India. India does not produce figures for sex ratios at birth, so its numbers are not strictly comparable. But there is no doubt that the number of boys has been rising relative to girls with regional disparities. The north-western states have sex ratios as high as the provinces of China’s east and south. Nationally, the ratio for children rose from 104 in 1981 to a biologically impossible 108 in 2001.

Conventional wisdom about such disparities is that they are the result of “backward thinking” in old-fashioned societies or – in China – of the one-child policy. By implication, reforming the policy or modernizing the society (for example, enhancing the status of women) should bring the sex ratio back to normal. Not all traditional societies show a marked preference for sons over daughters. But in those that do, especially those in which the family line passes through the son and where he is supposed to look after his aging parents, a son is worth more than a daughter. A

girl is deemed to have joined her husband's family on marriage, and is lost to her parents. As a Hindu saying puts it, "Raising a daughter is like watering your neighbours' garden."

"Son preference" is discernible – overwhelming, even – in polling evidence. In 1999 the government of India asked women what sex they wanted their child to be. One third of those without children said a son, two-thirds had no preference and only a residual said a daughter. Polls carried out in Pakistan and Yemen show similar results. In China midwives charge more for delivering a son than a daughter.

Until the 1980s people in poor countries could do little about this preference. But in that decade, ultrasound scanning and other methods of detecting the sex of a child before birth began to make their appearance. These technologies changed everything. Doctors in India started advertising ultrasounds scans with the slogan "Pay 5,000 rupees (\$110) today and save 50,000 rupees tomorrow" (the saving was on the cost of a daughter's dowry). Parents who wanted a son, but balked at killing baby daughters, chose abortion in their millions.

The use of sex-selective abortion was banned in India in 1994 and in China in 1995. It is illegal in most countries (though Sweden legalized the practice in 2009). But since it is almost impossible to prove that an abortion has been carried out for reasons of sex selection, the practice remains widespread. An ultrasound scan costs about \$12, which is within the scope of many Chinese and Indian families. In one hospital in northern India, the only girls born after a round of ultrasound scans had been mistakenly identified as boys, or else had a male twin.

The spread of fetal-imaging technology has not only skewed the sex ratio but also explains what would otherwise be something of a puzzle: sexual disparities tend to rise with income and education, which you would not expect if "backward thinking" was all that mattered. In India, some of the most prosperous states – Maharashtra, Punjab, Gujarat – have the worst sex ratios. In China, the higher a province's literacy rate, the more skewed its sex ratio. The ratio also rises with income per head.

Second and third daughters of well-educated mothers were more than twice as likely to die before their fifth birthday as their brothers, regardless of their birth order. The discrepancy was far lower in poorer households. Women do not necessarily use improvements in education and income to help daughters. Richer, well-educated families share their poorer neighbours' preference for sons and, because they tend to have smaller families, come under greater pressure to produce a son and heir if their first child is an unlooked-for daughter.

[Up until 2016, when the two-child policy was introduced] In most Chinese cities couples are usually allowed to have only one child – the policy in its pure form. But in the countryside, where 55% of China's population lives, there are three variants of the one-child policy. In the coastal provinces some 40% of couples are



permitted a second child if their first is a girl. In central and southern provinces everyone is permitted a second child either if the first is a girl or if the parents suffer “hardship”, a criterion determined by local officials. In the far west and Inner Mongolia, the provinces do not really operate a one-child policy at all. Minorities are permitted second – sometimes even third – children, whatever the sex of the first-born (see map).

The provinces in this last group are the only ones with close to normal sex ratios. They are sparsely populated and inhabited by ethnic groups that do not much like abortion and whose family systems do not disparage the value of daughters. As for India, . . . First-born daughters were treated the same as their brothers; younger sisters were more likely to die in infancy. The rule seems to be that parents will joyfully embrace a daughter as their first child. But they will go to extraordinary lengths to ensure subsequent children are sons.

### **The hazards of bare branches:**

Throughout human history, young men have been responsible for the vast preponderance of crime and violence – especially single men in countries where status and social acceptance depend on being married and having children, as it does in China and India. A rising population of frustrated single men spells trouble. The crime rate has almost doubled in China during the past 20 years of rising sex ratios, with stories abounding of bride abduction, the trafficking of women, rape and prostitution. A study into whether these things were connected concluded that they were, and that higher sex ratios accounted for about one-seventh of the rise in crime. In India, too, there is a correlation between provincial crime rates and sex ratios.

Violence is not the only consequence. In parts of India, the cost of dowries is said to have fallen. Where people pay a bride price (i.e., the groom’s family gives money to the bride’s), that price has risen. During the 1990s, China saw the appearance of tens of thousands of “extra-birth guerrilla troops” – couples from one-child areas who live in a legal limbo, shifting restlessly from city to city in order to shield their two or three children from the authorities. And, female suicide rates in China are among the highest in the world (as are South Korea’s). Suicide is the commonest form of death among Chinese rural women aged 15-34; young mothers kill themselves by drinking agricultural fertilizers. It is believed that they cannot live with the knowledge that they have aborted or killed their baby daughters.

Some of the consequences of the skewed sex ratio have been unexpected. It has probably increased China’s savings rate. This is because parents with a single son save to increase his chances of attracting a wife in China’s ultra-competitive marriage market. Researchers calculate that about half the increase in China’s savings in the past 25 years can be attributed to the rise in the sex ratio. Over the next generation, many of the problems associated with sex selection will get worse. The social consequences will become more evident because the boys born in large numbers over the past decade will reach maturity then. Meanwhile, the practice of sex selection itself may spread because fertility rates are continuing to fall as ultrasound scanners reach throughout the developing world.

Yet the story of the destruction of baby girls does not end in deepest gloom. At least one country – South Korea – has reversed its cultural preference for sons and cut the distorted sex ratio. There are reasons for thinking China and India might follow suit.

South Korea was the first country to report exceptionally high sex ratios and has been the first to cut them. Between 1985 and 2003, the share of South Korean women who told national health surveyors that they felt “they must have a son” fell by almost two-thirds, from 48% to 17%. After a lag of a decade, the sex ratio began to fall in the mid-1990s and is now 110 to 100. It has been argued that though it takes a long time for social norms favoring sons to alter, and though the transition can be delayed by the introduction of ultrasound scans, eventually change will come. Modernization not only makes it easier for parents to control the sex of their children, it also changes people’s values and undermines those norms which set a higher store on sons. At some point, one trend becomes more important than the other. It is just possible that China and India may be reaching that point now. The census of 2000 and the CASS study both show the sex ratio stable at around 120. At the very least, it seems to have stopped rising

In India, one study found that the cultural preference for sons has been falling, and that the sex ratio, as in much of China, is rising more slowly. In villages, grandmothers sit veiled and silent while men are present. But their daughters sit and chat uncovered because, they say, they have seen unveiled women at work or on television so much that at last it seems normal to them.

Though the two giants are much poorer than South Korea, their governments are doing more to persuade people to treat girls equally (anti-discrimination laws and media campaigns). The unintended consequences of sex selection have been vast. They may get worse. But as pointed out by Ms. Gupta, “. . . there seems to be an incipient turnaround in the phenomenon of ‘missing girls’ in Asia.”

## **QUESTIONS:**

1. Describe some of the cultural and social causes of “gendercide.” Why is there such a preference for boys in particular cultures?
2. Describe some of the negative effects this skewed sex ratio has on countries.
3. What are some of the specific countries/areas in which gender preferences are the highest?
4. About halfway through the article the author cites a Hindu saying that “Raising a daughter is like watering your neighbors’ garden.” Based on what you read, what do you interpret this to mean?
5. Describe the role that sonogram machines have played in INCREASING “gendercide.”

## **Reading No. 3: Where the Hell is Matt? 2012** **(Video and Map Assignment)**



*Matt Harding became quite famous on YouTube for creating a series of videos that feature him dancing with various people from around the world. Little did he realize he was creating a Human Geography video!*

Watch the following video (YouTube - “Where the Hell is Matt 2012”):

**<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pwe-pA6TaZk>**

**Directions:** Choose any four (4) places Matt visited (NOT THE U.S.). Answer the questions below. These answers do not have to be in complete sentences or paragraph format. You may use bullet points.

**It is recommended that you watch the entire video first then go back and pick your four countries.**

1. On what continent is the country?
2. What other countries does it border (list them all)?
3. What is the closest major body of water?
4. Write down anything you know/associate with that country (it doesn't have to be accurate necessarily, just what you think of when you hear that country).

\*The following website can guide you in terms of maps:

<http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/maps.htm>